In 1905 the Germans seized on Russia’s temporary troubles to pressure France in Morocco. Bülow believed he had much to gain—at best he might force a breakup of the Anglo-French entente, at worst he might provoke a French retreat and secure German rights in Morocco. But at the Algeciras Conference in 1906, called to settle the Morocco dispute, only Austria-Hungary supported the German position. Far from breaking the Entente Cordiale, the affair prompted the British to begin secret staff talks with the French military. The United States, Russia, and even Italy, Germany’s erstwhile partner in the Triple Alliance, took France’s side. For some years Italian ambitions in the Mediterranean had been thwarted, and the attempt to conquer Abyssinia in 1896 had failed. The German alliance seemed to offer little, while Rome’s other foreign objective, the Italian irredenta in the Tirol and Dalmatia, was aimed at Austria-Hungary. So in 1900 Italy concluded a secret agreement pledging support for France in Morocco in return for French support of Italy in Libya. The Russo-Japanese War also strengthened ties between France and Russia as French loans again rebuilt Russia’s shattered armed forces. Finally, and most critically, the defeated Russians and worried British were now willing to put to rest their old rivalry in Central Asia. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 made a neutral buffer of Tibet, recognized Britain’s interest in Afghanistan, and partitioned Persia into spheres of influence. Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey also hinted at the possibility of British support for Russian policy in the Balkans, reversing a century-old tradition.

The heyday of European imperialism thus called into existence a second alliance system, the Triple Entente of France, Britain, and Russia. It was not originally conceived as a balance to German power, but that was its effect, especially in light of the escalating naval race. In 1906 the Royal Navy under the reformer Sir John Fisher launched HMS Dreadnought, a battleship whose size, armour, speed, and gunnery rendered all existing warships obsolete. The German government responded in kind, even enlarging the Kiel Canal at great expense to accommodate the larger ships. What were the British, dependent on imports by sea for seven-eighths of their raw materials and over half their foodstuffs, to make of German behaviour? In a famous Foreign Office memo of January 1907, Senior Clerk Sir Eyre Crowe surmised that Weltpolitik was either a conscious bid for hegemony or a “vague, confused, and unpractical statesmanship not realizing its own drift.” As Ambassador Sir Francis Bertie put it, “The Germans aim to push us into the water and steal our clothes.”

For France the Triple Entente was primarily a continental security apparatus. For Russia it was a means of reducing points of conflict so that the antiquated tsarist system could buy time to catch up technologically with the West. For Britain the ententes, the Japanese alliance, and the “special relationship” with the United States were diplomatic props for an empire beyond Britain’s capacity to defend alone. The three powers’ interests by no means coincided—disputes over Persia alone might have smashed Anglo-Russian unity if the war had not intervened. But to the Germans the Triple Entente looked suspiciously like encirclement designed to frustrate their rightful claims to world power and prestige. German attempts to break the encirclement, however, would only alarm the entente powers and cause them to draw the loose strings into a knot. That in turn tempted German leaders, fearful that time was against them, to cut the Gordian knot with the sword. For after 1907 the focus of diplomacy shifted back to the Balkans, with European cabinets unaware, until it was too late, that alliances made with the wide world in mind had dangerously limited their freedom of action in Europe.