Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe
- Date:
- June 19, 2000
- Location:
- Texas
- United States
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, case in which the U.S. Supreme Court on June 19, 2000, ruled (6–3) that a Texas school board policy that allowed “student-led, student-initiated prayer” before varsity high-school football games was a violation of the First Amendment’s establishment clause, which generally prohibits the government from establishing, advancing, or giving favour to any religion.
The case initially arose in 1995 over various religion-related activities at Santa Fe High School in Texas; the respondents filed under the name Doe in order to protect their identity. However, the issue that eventually reached the U.S. Supreme Court concerned a policy that called for students to vote on whether prayers would be delivered prior to football games and to select a student who would deliver them. After the students approved the inclusion of prayers at the game, a federal district court ruled that only nonsectarian and nonproselytizing prayers could be delivered. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, ruled that any football prayer was unconstitutional, as a violation of the establishment clause.
On March 29, 2000, the case was argued before the Supreme Court. The school board contended that control of the pregame message was left to students who also chose the speaker and the content of the message by a majority vote. Thus, according to the board, the prayer qualified as “private speech” and was protected by the First Amendment’s free speech and free exercise clauses. However, the court ruled that
the delivery of such a message—over the school’s public address system, by a speaker representing the student body, under the supervision of school faculty, and pursuant to a school policy that explicitly and implicitly encourages public prayer—is not properly characterized as “private” speech.
The court was of the opinion that the policy would only lead to student messages that were, rather than private speech, actually religious speech directly sponsored and endorsed by a governmental agency.
The board also argued that because the football games were completely voluntary, there was no issue of mandatory attendance or coercion of students to attend and be subjected to the prayer. The Supreme Court, however, rejected the argument, observing that many students are obligated to attend football games, even to earn credit in classes such as athletics, band, and other extracurricular activities. In addition, the court noted that, even if students were not mandated to go the game, the “immense social pressure” would cause many to attend.
Moreover, the court held that the board’s policy violated the first part of the so-called Lemon test (Lemon v. Kurtzman [1971]), which ruled that a statute was invalid if it did not have a secular legislative purpose; in fact, the only purpose the court found for the policy was to endorse student-led prayer. Thus, the court concluded that the football prayer violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment. The ruling of the Fifth Circuit was upheld.
