Cohens v. Virginia
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Cohens v. Virginia, (1821), U.S. Supreme Court case in which the court reaffirmed its right to review all state court judgments in cases arising under the federal Constitution or a law of the United States. The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for mandatory Supreme Court review of the final judgments of the highest court of any state in cases “where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States and the decision is against its validity” or “where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.”
In a case involving a dispute over extensive lands, Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee (1813), the Supreme Court had reversed Virginia’s highest court and commanded it to enter a judgment in favour of the party originally ruled against. The Virginia court refused to obey the Supreme Court’s mandate, declaring that “the appellate power of the Supreme Court of the United States does not extend to this court.” As a result, the Supreme Court in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee (1816) affirmed the constitutionality of the Judiciary Act, thus asserting its right to appellate jurisdiction.
Chief Justice John Marshall did not participate in either decision because he and his brother had contracted to purchase part of the land. Thus, the Cohens case presented him with his first opportunity to express himself on appellate jurisdiction. Two brothers named Cohen had been convicted in a Norfolk, Vir., court for selling District of Columbia lottery tickets in violation of Virginia law. The Cohens claimed they were immune from state laws because the lottery tickets had been authorized by Congress. Although the U.S. Supreme Court decided against them on the merits of the case, an opinion by Marshall reasserted the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over state courts and took a harsh view of the reliability of state courts. Marshall wrote, “In many states, the judges are dependent for office and for salary on the will of the legislature. [When] we observe the importance which [the Constitution] attaches to the independence of judges, we are the less inclined to suppose that it can have intended to leave these constitutional questions to tribunals where this independence may not exist, in all cases where a state shall prosecute an individual who claims the protection of an act of Congress.”
