prospect theory
- Also called:
- loss-aversion theory
- Related Topics:
- decision making
prospect theory, psychological theory of decision-making under conditions of risk, which was developed by psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky and originally published in 1979 in Econometrica. The model has been imported into a number of fields and has been used to analyze various aspects of political decision-making, especially in international relations.
Prospect theory was based on a series of experimental empirical demonstrations of actual human choice behavior; it was developed to present a descriptively accurate model of human decision-making. Nevertheless, the domain in which prospect theory explored human decision-making was primarily based on choices among a series of financial bets and gambles. It was not originally intended to provide wider generalization beyond that domain, although it has subsequently been used to explain a wide variety of phenomena across many fields, including law, political science, and economics.
Prospect theory states that decision-making depends on choosing among options that may themselves rest on biased judgments. Thus, it built on earlier work conducted by Kahneman and Tversky on judgmental heuristics and the biases that can accompany assessments of frequency and probability. Such judgments involve evaluations of the external world; decisions involve more fundamentally internal choices across values. Thus, the essence of decision-making involves a trade-off between values.
The two phases of prospect theory
Prospect theory encompasses two distinct phases: (1) an editing phase and (2) an evaluation phase. The editing phase refers to the way in which individuals characterize options for choice. Most frequently, these are referred to as framing effects. Framing effects demonstrate the way in which the substance of a person’s choice can be affected by the order, method, or wording in which it is presented. The classic demonstration of this effect took place in the so-called Asian disease paradigm, in which people were asked to make a choice among public policy plans for responding to a disease outbreak. Although the actual statistical probabilities remained identical, the percentage of people supporting a given plan changed dramatically based on whether or not the outcomes were presented in terms of the number of people who would live versus the number of people who would die. In perhaps the most dramatic demonstration of this effect, real-world patients suffering from cancer made different choices of whether to undergo surgery or chemotherapy for treatment of their illness based on whether the outcome percentages were presented in terms of survival or mortality. Once people are presented with both choices side by side, they can easily see that the substance of the decision remains the same, even if the psychic pull to perceive them differently remains.
Once choices are framed for decision, prospect theory enters its second, evaluation phase. This phase involves two component elements. The first element is graphically represented by the value function. This function differs from standard normative models by including a left-hand side to the graph that represents how people respond to loss. In this way, prospect theory differs from standard economic models that always encourage prudence as the better part of valour. Regardless of the normative imprimatur of such advice, this does not accurately characterize how most people make decisions. There are three important aspects to the value function that effectively distinguish it from expected utility in particular. First, the model examines the way in which value is related to the original reference point, or the start of action or choice. In most situations, this reference point is assumed to refer to the person’s current status quo position, but this is not necessarily required within the confines of the model. Rather, the operative reference point can be defined by some future level of aspiration or some kind of social comparison. But the key insight of the model is that the hedonic value of choice options is assessed by the way in which people evaluate change, movement, distance, or difference between where they are, or where they want to be, and the outcome offered by a particular choice. In other words, relative outcomes matter more than absolute outcomes.
The second important insight offered by the value function relates to the central prediction of the model. People tend to be more risk-averse when in a domain of gains, where things are going well and appear to be likely to continue to improve or where actors confront primarily opportunities for gains. Simultaneously, actors tend to be much more risk-seeking in the realm of losses, where they are much more likely to take risks in order to recoup previous losses or to recover from a loss in order to revert to a previous position.
The last important element of the value function recognizes that losses hurt more than equal gains please. Loss-aversion has indeed become the most robust finding in the entire model. In general, people have to be offered about two and a half times as much as a loss in order to prove willing to take a risk for the chance of a gain.
The second element of the evaluation phase is characterized by the weighting function. This function contains two critical insights. First, people treat outcomes that are deemed to be either certain or impossible very differently than those whose changes take place in the midrange of probability. In other words, people simply assign more psychological weight and importance to outcomes that they can characterize with greater certainty. While this is not justifiable from a normative perspective, most people treat quite unlikely events as though they were impossible and quite likely events as though they were certain to occur. Second, people tend to attribute more importance than normatively justified to low-probability events. They simultaneously apply less psychological weight to medium- and high-probability outcomes than are normatively warranted.
The interaction of the value function and the weighting function lead to some very interesting and counterintuitive explanations and predictions for phenomena such as insurance (taking a sure loss against the small possibility of a larger loss) and lotteries (taking a sure loss against the even smaller possibility of a large gain). Because people overweight small-probability events, the main prediction of prospect theory reverses close to the reference point as individuals become risk-seeking in gains (lotteries) and risk-averse in losses (insurance).