habitual offender

criminology
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habitual offender, person who frequently has been convicted of criminal behaviour and is presumed to be a danger to society. In an attempt to protect society from such criminals, penal systems throughout the world provide for lengthier terms of imprisonment for them than for first-time offenders. In the 1990s habitual-offender laws became harsher, and in extreme cases some offenders were detained permanently.

The idea of habitual-offender legislation reflects the basic assumption of positivist criminology that crime is analogous to disease and should be treated by comparably flexible measures. According to this view, a person with persistent tendencies to commit crimes should be quarantined from society as would someone with a seriously infectious disease. During the first half of the 20th century, advocates of habitual-offender legislation appealed to then-popular biological theories of crime to argue that if a person committed several major crimes, it was reasonable to assume that he was criminal by nature and needed to be imprisoned indefinitely. In the 1950s, however, the work of criminologist Marvin Wolfgang and others indicated that only a relatively small number of criminals become serious multiple offenders and that these criminals commit the great majority of violent crimes and serious offenses against property. Some studies suggest that this dangerous hard core constitutes only about 2 percent of all offenders.

In theory, identifying and incapacitating such offenders early in their criminal careers should prevent a large number of serious crimes. In practice, however, it is difficult to devise laws that identify not just habitual offenders but all those who are likely to commit serious crimes. For example, many laws stipulate that once an individual has been convicted of three felonies, he should qualify for habitual-offender status and receive a lengthy prison term. But in various U.S. states, many nonviolent and less-serious offenses—such as committing fraud, bouncing checks, and even committing bigamy—are considered felonious crimes. The incarceration of those who commit such offenses is, at a minimum, controversial. Another point of controversy is that the availability of habitual-offender laws may unfairly enhance the powers of prosecutors, who can entice petty offenders to plead guilty by threatening to charge them with felonies that would earn them habitual status.

In the 1990s several habitual-offender laws were passed in the United States and elsewhere in the belief that they would help to reduce violent crime. In 1994 California enacted a so-called “three strikes and you’re out” statute, which imposed a life sentence for a third serious felony conviction. These laws, which remain controversial, contributed to a dramatic increase in the prison population. Despite such criticisms, nearly half of American states and the federal government had some form of three-strikes legislation by the end of the 1990s.

John Philip Jenkins