Problems with the sensitive issue of verifying Ivoirian citizenship and slow progress with voter registration and the disarmament of militias led to the repeated postponement of elections. After several delays the presidential election was finally held on October 31, 2010—five years after Gbagbo’s term as president had expired. The presidency was contested by Gbagbo, former prime minister Alassane Ouattara, and former president Henri Konan Bédié. Some 80 percent of Ivoirian voters participated in the election—purported to be one of the highest turnout rates ever experienced by an African country. Gbagbo and Ouattara garnered the most votes—38 percent and 32 percent, respectively—but, as neither candidate received a majority, a runoff election was scheduled.

The second round of voting, which took place on November 28, 2010, did not go as smoothly as the first. Prior to the release of the results, Gbagbo announced his intent to challenge the outcome of the election, alleging fraudulent practices and instances of voter intimidation in the northern part of the country, where Ouattara was popular. However, international observers, while noting some instances of voter intimidation, did not find that it was widespread and deemed the election to be largely democratic. Gbagbo later asked the Constitutional Council to annul portions of the vote. After a delay, the electoral commission announced on December 2, 2010, that Ouattara was the winner, with 54 percent of the vote, but shortly thereafter the Constitutional Council contested the results because they were not released in accordance with the established deadline. The next day the Constitutional Council, citing evidence of numerous irregularities, discounted a portion of the results. It then declared Gbagbo to be the winner, with 51 percent of the vote. Most of the international community—including the UN, which had overseen the voting process and certified the results—maintained that Ouattara was the rightful winner. Nevertheless, Gbagbo, who had the support of the country’s military and top levels of government, was sworn in for another term as president, while Ouattara, who still had international backing as well as the support of the New Forces rebel troops that controlled the northern part of the country, also had himself sworn in as president and formed a parallel government.

The political standoff sparked fears that the country might descend into civil conflict once again, and the African Union (AU) attempted to mediate the crisis. International pressure on Gbagbo to step down increased, and both ECOWAS and the AU suspended the country’s membership in their respective organizations to protest his refusal to hand over power to Ouattara. Gbagbo and his close associates were the target of various sanctions and travel bans, including those by the United States and the European Union. Still, Gbagbo dug in his heels, even in the face of financial pressure, as the World Bank cut funding to the country. The Central Bank of the States of West Africa (Banque Centrale des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest; BCEAO), which held the country’s accounts, recognized Ouattara as president and denied funds to Gbagbo’s administration, although this was not immediately enforced and Gbagbo was still able to withdraw funds for a while. He later had forces seize regional branches of the BCEAO and attempted to keep them operational for his purposes.

As the stalemate dragged on, the Ivoirian people and economy suffered. Tens of thousands of Ivoirians had been displaced by the crisis, and there were allegations of human rights abuses. Even those not displaced had to deal with a shortage of goods and services as well as dwindling funds. More financial pressure on Gbagbo, in addition to sanctions already in place, came in late January 2011 with a call by Ouattara for a ban on the country’s important cocoa exports, which the international community largely heeded; it affected workers in cocoa-related industries such as farming, trading, and transport. In February several international commercial banks in the country announced that they could not continue to operate and would have to close. This sparked a rush of Ivoirians lining up in long queues to withdraw money, many unable to do so because there was no longer any currency available for circulation. Gbagbo responded with an announcement that the banks would be nationalized and reopened, but it was unclear where his government would find the money necessary to resume operations.

Return to normalcy

Meanwhile, Ouattara’s party, Rally of the Republicans (Rassemblement des Républicains; RDR), performed well in legislative elections held in late 2011 and early 2012, netting about half of the seats in the National Assembly. Furthermore, the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire; PDCI), which had been allied with the RDR and other parties since 2005 in the Houphouetist Rally for Democracy and Peace (Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix; RHDP) coalition, garnered almost one-third of the seats, bolstering Ouattara’s support in the National Assembly. Ouattara was able to make progress in the area of economic recovery; indeed, the country’s economy showed strong growth under his administration. The RHDP-dominated National Assembly was able to enact laws addressing the long-contentious issues of land ownership and who was entitled to Ivoirian citizenship.

As the presidential election of 2015 drew near, political and economic issues figured prominently. Not all voters were satisfied with the country’s economic growth, as the benefits had not reached all Ivoirians. Former president Gbagbo still had many supporters, and there were complaints that Ouattara had not done enough to cultivate reconciliation. Some opposition presidential candidates were critical of the election preparation and withdrew from the race in the days leading up to the poll, and some voters also called for a boycott of the election. In spite of such calls, turnout was more than 50 percent and the voting proceeded peacefully. Ouattara was declared the winner, garnering almost 84 percent of the vote. International observers deemed the vote to be free, fair, and credible.

In 2016 the country had its first brush with the wave of jihadist terrorism that had already hit other western African countries. On March 13, militants from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib attacked a beachside resort area in Grand-Bassam, killing 19 people and wounding more than 30.

Also in 2016, Ouattara followed through on one of his campaign promises and promulgated a new constitution, which he claimed would promote peace after years of conflict, but critics decried it as a power grab for him and his party. The new constitution created a post for a vice president, who would be selected by the president. It also changed the country’s unicameral legislature, making it bicameral with the addition of a Senate. Two-thirds of the Senate would be indirectly elected by local and regional councillors, and the remaining one-third would be appointed by the president. The new constitution eliminated the controversial rule that both parents of a presidential candidate must be natural-born Ivoirians, a restriction that had been used to disqualify Ouattara and other northerners from standing in elections prior to 2010, and instead stipulated that only one parent needed to be of Ivoirian origin. A referendum on the new constitution was held October 30; the opposition boycotted the poll. The new constitution was approved by an overwhelming margin of more than 93 percent, although only some two-fifths of eligible voters participated. It was promulgated on November 8. On the heels of the constitutional referendum, National Assembly elections were held on December 18. Ouattara’s RDR and other parties allied with it in the ruling RHDP coalition won a majority, taking almost two-thirds of the seats, ensuring that Ouattara was well positioned to have legislative support for his agenda.

The Senate that had been provided for under the 2016 constitution was finally created in 2018. In February it was announced that the indirect elections for the Senate seats would be held the following month. The opposition boycotted the elections, citing several reasons, including their complaint that the process had been rushed and that the new body was expensive and unnecessary and would be dominated by supporters of Ouattara. The parties of the ruling coalition did indeed win a majority in the Senate, taking 50 of the 66 seats up for election. The new body was inaugurated in April but without the presidential appointees that would fill the remaining seats; Ouattara appointed them in April 2019.

Also in 2018, Ouattara’s RDR and most of the other parties in the ruling RHDP coalition agreed to transform the coalition into a new party. Bédié’s PDCI rejected the proposal, however, largely because the RDR had dismissed the PDCI’s insistence that it was the PDCI’s turn to field the coalition’s presidential candidate, who was to run in the 2020 elections. The new party, which retained the name of the coalition, was launched in July 2018 without the PDCI.

New political tensions

Meanwhile, there were questions about whether Ouattara would attempt to stand for a third presidential term, which was only possible under one controversial theory of how the promulgation of a new constitution in 2016 reset the limit of two terms enshrined in the previous constitution, therefore making Ouattara eligible to run again. In March 2020 he said he would not stand again, and he enthusiastically endorsed Prime Minister Amadou Gon Coulibaly, whom the RHDP named as its candidate for the October 2020 presidential election. Coulibaly’s unexpected death in July, however, left the RHDP scrambling to find another candidate with the necessary qualifications and appeal. Against this backdrop, in August, Ouattara announced that he would in fact stand for a third term and would represent the RHDP in the upcoming election. Unsurprisingly, this angered the opposition, who believed the move was unconstitutional as they did not adhere to the interpretation that the 2016 constitution reset the counter on the limit of two terms. Later that month the Constitutional Council disqualified 40 aspiring presidential candidates and approved only four: Ouattara, former president Bédié. and two others. Among the rejected candidates were Gbagbo and Soro. Ouattara’s decision to stand for a third term as well as the Constitutional Council’s actions led to protests and violence, and opposition leaders urged their supporters to boycott the election. Rulings from the African Court on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR), a continent-wide body, that Gbagbo and Soro should be allowed to run in the election went unheeded by the Ivoirian government, which had withdrawn its recognition of the court’s jurisdiction months earlier.

The presidential election was held on October 31, 2020. In light of the boycott, Ouattara was, as expected, the winner, taking about 94 percent of the vote. The official turnout figure was reported as 54 percent, though the opposition and some election observer groups disputed that the figure could be that high, and opposition groups did not recognize the results of the election. Furthermore, several opposition leaders announced that they were forming a rival government, the National Transitional Council, which quickly led to the arrests of the opposition leaders and supporters involved in the short-lived alternative government. Amid the heightened political tensions, Ouattara was sworn in for his third term on December 14, 2020.

National Assembly elections were held in March 2021, with most opposition groups participating in the polls. The RHDP won more than half of the seats, maintaining a hold on the legislative body.